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Supreme Court enthusiasm for creating federal common law
reached its high points in Swift v. Tyson's' declaration of the
federal courts' duty to create federal common law in contract
cases and the Court's extension of that idea to tort cases in
1893.2 Even by 1893, however, the Swift doctrine's countenanc-
ing of a general federal common law had its'detractors, 3 and Jus-
tices' statements of dissatisfaction culminated in Justice
Holmes' well-known dissent ten years before Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins" was decided.5 Erie buried the Swift doctrine and
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1. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
3. Id. at 403 (Field, J., dissenting) ("[T]his, like other errors, will, in the end, 'die
among its worshippers' ").
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to Swift as "an unconstitutional assumption of
1
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sharply curtailed, through clearly did not signal the end of, fed-
eral common law."
In the last two decades, and particularly since Justice Pow-
ell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,' some judges
and commentators have suggested that the creation of federal
common law is always (or almost always) illegitimate, relying for
that conclusion not upon the federalism theories stressed so
heavily in Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Erie, but
instead on concepts of separation of powers. The debate has in-
tensified in recent years and promises to continue, not least be-
cause some of the Court's most ardent proponents of what has
been called the New Erie Doctrine themselves on occasion crete
federal common law.8 The authors in this symposium present
enlightened, thought-provoking and substantially disparate
views of the role of the federal courts with respect to the propri-
ety of creating federal common law in light of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
powers .... .
6. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938) (decided the same day as Erie and declaring that federal common law governed a
dispute over the apportionment of water from an interstate stream); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (applying federal common law to determined the
rights and duties of the United States with respect to federally-issued commercial
paper).
7. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See generally
Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L.
REV. 759.
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